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23 May 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Committee Papers

1. Your 25 April terms of reference (attached) asked you (i.e., CIA) to prepare three papers:

- (a) An analysis and estimate of the situation
- (b) An estimate of the consequences of several military courses of action
- (c) An assessment of whether (and how) the US-GVN intelligence relationship could be improved and targetted more effectively.

2. As you will recall, we reviewed the terms of reference and factored out seventeen separate topics therefrom. These were assigned around the Agency as separate papers. Our thought was that once they were done, I would write a single paper, based on these inputs, which would serve as the analysis and estimate requested. To satisfy the dual requirements for a usable paper plus an in-depth study, we subsequently decided to bind the separate papers as a back-up book to my single paper.

3. As I explained yesterday, things got slightly snarled as the result of actions taken by R. J. Smith with the best of professional intent but in ignorance of the precise nature (or, for that matter, the existence) of your White House requirements. Mr. Smith rejected the draft summary I had prepared (tailored to these requirements) and used a summary prepared on his instructions by OCI. This will be coming to you from the DDI along with the back-up book and multiple copies of the 12 May ONE paper "Reactions to Various US Courses of Action." The latter is the "consequences estimate" mentioned in paragraph 1 above.

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4. Attached herewith are

- (a) A copy of my analysis paper, typed in final form per your instructions. This document has not been coordinated outside of SAVA (for the reason explained above) but does faithfully reflect the judgments of the inputs, which were coordinated
- (b) A paper called "The Intelligence Attack on the Viet Cong Infrastructure," which discharges the third of the three requirements outlined in paragraph 1. This paper has been coordinated with FE Division.

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5. I am only attaching single copies of our two SAVA documents to this memorandum. My secretary, however, is giving [] eight extra sets, each including both papers, so you will have enough copies for all the committee members, if you want them.

6. The 25 April Katzenbach memo spoke of actions which could be taken to bring the Vietnam situation to a successful conclusion. I do not know how deeply you wish to get into the action recommendation field, but there are four things that urgently need to be done in Vietnam:

- (a) We must stop the Communist attempt to regain the strategic military initiative and compel us to disperse our forces to check our offensive operations and make at least some pacified areas vulnerable. This means more allied troops, soon. We think it means a minimum of one additional division and preferably two.
- (b) ARVN, somehow, has to be persuaded to dig into its pacification security mission and go about it the right way. We do not need a "screen," for a "screen" will never work. ARVN, province-by-province, must identify, seek out, harass, and eliminate the VC village platoons, district companies and provincial battalions. This offensive rooting out of Communist local forces is the only road to local security.

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- (c) Working covertly (e.g. through [] and other station assets) we have got to try to reach Ky and Thieu and shortstop their burgeoning rivalry before it does irrevocable damage to the unity of the military establishment.
- (d) We must avoid adopting a bombing strategy that Hanoi can construe as a political and psychological victory or a vindication of their estimate of our political inability to stay the course.

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George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachments

- (1) 25 April Katzenbach Memo
- (2) Analysis and Estimate
- (3) Infrastructure Attack Paper

Distribution:

Original - Director, w/atts.

1 - GAC Chrono, w/o ~~all~~ atts. (~~Katzenbach memo excepted~~)

1 - ~~VAS Chrono~~, w/o all atts. (Katzenbach memo excepted)

OCJ audited

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